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INDIVIDUAL JUDGES' PRACTICES: AN
INADVERTENT SUBVERSION OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MYRON J. BROMBERG*
JONATHAN M. KoRN**
INTRODUCTION
The original purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Federal Rules") was to promote consistency and efficiency within
the federal judicial system.1 These uniform rules were intended to
provide practicing attorneys with consistent procedures for use in
federal courts. Since their enactment in 1938, the Federal Rules
have been refined to meet the changing needs of the federal court
system. In recent years, however, individual judges, rather than
* Managing Principal, Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., Morristown, New
Jersey. B.A. Yale University, 1956; LL.B. Columbia University, 1959. Member, Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers. Member, American Law Institute.
** Associate, Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., Morristown, New Jersey. B.A.
Duke University, 1989; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1992.
1 See 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1029 (2d ed. 1987); see also MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 2 (4th ed. 1985).
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local district courts or the Supreme Court, have promulgated their
own "rules," "procedures," and "practices."2
It is beyond cavil that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be supplemented to adjust to local conditions within the
federal court system. However, the goals of the Federal Rules re-
quire that individual judges not be allowed to either amend the
Rules or to adopt their own inconsistent rules.3 This Article ad-
dresses the problems that occur when individual judges adopt
"practices" which lack consonance with either the Federal Rules or
local district court rules. The impact of individual judges' proce-
dures in the area of motion practice, specifically pre-motion re-
quirements, is particularly examined. Such procedures make it
difficult, expensive, and occasionally, impossible for litigants to
file pretrial motions, and inherently conflict with the Federal
Rules.4 Moreover, these pre-motion procedures raise serious due
process concerns that have been ignored in the inexorable drive
towards increased judicial management. Planned and balanced
judicial management should be encouraged, but not to the point of
2 Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 83. This Rule states in pertinent part: "Each district court
by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time, after giving appro-
priate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules." Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory com-
mittee note ("[The Rule] attempts to assure that the expert advice of practitioners and
scholars is made available to the district court before local rules are promulgated.").
Rule 83 refers only to individual judges' "practices." However, case law and authors
use the terms "rules" and "procedures" without differentiation in this context.
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee note (stating that rules governing
practice may be provided by district courts if not inconsistent with existing Federal
Rules).
4 See, e.g., Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1987)
(serving as example of judges tailoring their pre-motion requirements to satisfy indi-
vidual preferences, such that conflict with Federal Rules arises).
The requirement of pre-motion conferences or pre-motion screening procedures is
especially widespread in the Federal District Courts of the Southern and Eastern Dis-
tricts of New York. See generally George Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost, Delay Out-
comes, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1993, at 2 (citing wider use of pre-motion conferences by
judges in Southern and Eastern Districts of New York). Approximately 20 of the 38
judges in the Southern District of New York require some type of pre-motion "proce-
dure." See, e.g., TENTATIVE GUIDE TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CML
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN; U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF
N.Y., 3 (1993) (stating "[a] pre-motion conference should be considered by the Court
where advisable. This conference can be an efficient method of expressing the Court's
view of the potential outcome of a dispositive motion and may dissuade a party from
making the motion"). The Local Rules of the Eastern District of New York require a
pre-motion telephone conference with the assigned judge. Still, six of fifteen Eastern
District Court judges have promulgated additional pre-motion "procedures."
INDIVIDUAL JUDGES' PRACTICES
either conflict with the Federal Rules or infringement upon proce-
dural due process.
I. THE ENACTMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 granted the Supreme Court
the authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
The Act empowered the Court to "prescribe, by general rules, for
the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the
District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law."6
The Act was passed after a twenty-year campaign to bring uni-
formity to the federal court system.7 Supporters of a uniform fed-
eral procedure bill advocated "a simple court structure, flexible
rules of procedure aim[ed] at the elimination of technicalities and
surprise, and.., the shortening and improvement of trials by pre-
trial conferences and modernized rules of evidence."8
On the other hand, opponents of a uniform system of federal
civil procedure argued that under such a system attorneys would
have to acquire knowledge of both state and federal civil proce-
dure.9 Federal practice at that time was based on the Conformity
Act, which required that the pleadings and practice in federal
court conform to those of the state in which the federal court sat.10
Advocates for uniform federal rules responded by stating that,
due to the myriad of federal statutes that affected procedure, fed-
eral judges often could not apply local state procedures anyway.
They also argued that the nonconformity between federal and
state practice led to a number of inefficiencies:
5 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
6 Id.
7 See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1001 (discussing history and
federal procedures).
8 Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial
Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 791-92 (1989) (quoting A.T. VANDER-
BILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAV REFORM 36 (1955)).
9 See Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BRoo. L. REv. 1, 14 (1988) (noting
that Montana Senator Thomas Walsh, staunch opponent of Act, argued that it would
uproot local practitioners and destroy state-by-state conformity previously required).
10 The Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255 § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197; Rev. Stat.
§ 914 ("[Tlhe practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in [civil] causes
in the circuit and district courts... shall conform... [to] the courts ... of the State
within which such circuit or district courts are held... ").
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1) the waste in time and money of judges and lawyers trying to
ascertain when in a particular federal district court to conform or
not to conform to state procedure; 2) the time and expense of ap-
pealing such decisions; and 3) the cost to clients ... of having to
retain different lawyers ... in different states, since experts on
the state procedure were required."'
Supporters of a uniform procedural system hoped to avoid the
same pitfalls created by conformity to state procedures. When the
Rules Enabling Act was finally passed, in addition to proposing
uniform procedure within the federal court system, it merged law
and equity courts, creating a single system.
The advocates of uniform federal rules prevailed, and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938 under the
authority of the Rules Enabling Act. The Federal Rules had a
number of prominent goals. First, as Attorney General Homer
Cummings stated when introducing the Rules Enabling Act to
Congress: "This will have a tendency to make procedure subsidi-
ary to the substantive law, as it should be, and will emphasize in
the minds of bench and bar substantive rights rather than mat-
ters of form."' 2 The drafters of the Federal Rules intended to en-
courage courts to reach the merits of a case rather than dismissing
it solely on minor procedural technicalities. Second, the Federal
Rules were intended to simplify procedure, thus making it easier
for litigants to bring a cause of action in federal court and provid-
ing a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion."i3 Third, the Federal Rules were to create a system of open
discovery to promote settlements through informed and realistic
negotiations.' 4 Fourth, the Federal Rules were intended to be
comprehensive so that there would be little need for additional in-
put from the lower courts.' 5
11 See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniform-
ity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002
(1989).
12 Current Events, 20 A.B.A. J. 457, 460 (1934).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see FED. R. Crv. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court.").
14 See FED R. Civ. P. 26 (providing that, in general, discovery may be obtained
regarding any relevant, unprivileged material).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988) ("The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules . . . consistent with Acts of
Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under [the Rules Enabling
Act].").
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In sum, the goals of the Federal Rules were to promote deci-
sions on the merits and to eliminate procedural hurdles. The
drafters allowed a significant degree of judicial discretion in order
to accomplish these goals. In recent years, however, exercise of
judicial discretion has begun to interfere with deciding cases on
the merits, and threatens to undermine the objectives of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. A "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" IN THE FEDERAL COURTS?
There has been significant commentary on whether the
number of cases entering the federal court system has actually in-
creased in recent years.' 6 The perceived increase in civil litigation
can be attributed to two factors. First, there has been a noted in-
crease in product liability actions and in litigation revolving
around federal governmental policies, especially prison litiga-
tion 7 and actions to recover social security benefits.' 8 Second, the
increase can be attributed to the success of the Federal Rules as
promulgated in 1938. The Federal Rules have accomplished the
goals of the drafters, who "sought to air out the courts and let the
sunlight of substance shine into them .... 1'9 Most significantly,
the Federal Rules transformed the federal courts into a less im-
posing place for both attorneys and litigants. In reality, however,
the number of civil cases entering the federal courts has decreased
in recent years, while the size of the criminal docket has expanded
as a result of increased crime and the trend towards the "federali-
zation" of crimes that were formerly state actions. Most district
16 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 2018 ("The number of cases in the federal courts
has risen dramatically. . ."); cf. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1901, 1907-10 (1989) (maintaining that "[slober attention to the statistical evidence
indicates that we are no more overwhelmed now than at many times in the past");
Lambros, supra note 8, at 792 n.24 (noting that civil and criminal case filings rose
from 46,914 in 1938 to 247,708 in 1983).
17 See Fred Strasser & Marcia Coyle, Prisons on the Precipice, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10,
1987, at 50 (stating that goal of prison litigation is to bring conditions up to minimum
standards of decency); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (requiring
prisoners to prove harm directly related to prison overcrowding); Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (developing "totality of conditions" test in prison
litigation).
18 Marianne Lavelle, Suit Says Reagan Gave Cold Shoulder to Poor, NATL L.J.,
Jan. 8, 1990, at 5 (citing litigation for Social Security benefits for mentally ill).
19 Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1906.
1994]
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courts cite increases in criminal filings, lack of funds, and judicial
vacancies as the main causes of any backlog in their courts.2 °
Despite these factors, the perceived "litigation explosion" has
energized a movement advocating increased judicial manage-
ment-sometimes by restricting access to the federal courts in or-
der to lessen the burden.2 ' Instead of expanding the court system
or improving its efficiency, advocates of this movement have al-
tered or interpreted the Federal Rules to increase the judicial
management of litigation. This trend towards increased judicial
management is further evidenced by the recent amendments to
the Federal Rules, 22 as well as the district courts' Expense and
Delay Reduction Plans, mandated by the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990.23 Increased judicial management of the litigation pro-
cess, however, has created conflicts with both the letter and the
spirit of the Federal Rules.
Increased judicial management has to an extent been imple-
mented through amendments to the Federal Rules. The need for
amendments was anticipated by the drafters, who realized that
the Federal Rules must respond to changes in the court system. 24
Individual judges, however, by adopting a broad view of the dis-
20 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
REPORT, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION
DISTRICTS AND PILOT COURTS (1992) (indicating that 17 of 34 district court advisory
committees cited failure to promptly fill judicial vacancies as impediment to "expedi-
tious civil case processing").
21 See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3152. "At times, district courts have
used their power under Rule 83 ... to escape from the arduous but essential task of
case-by-case analysis." Id. (quoting Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1967)).
22 See generally Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993,
at 1 (citing system of automatic ratification of proposed rules unless Congress acts
regarding amendments).
23 See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN; U.S. DIST. CT.
FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL. (1991) (discussing case management systems, pre-trial and
settlement conferences, automatic disclosure, and motion practice); CIVIL JUSTICE Ex-
PANSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN; U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W. DIST. OF OKLA. (1991)
(discussing systematic differential treatment of civil cases, control of pretrial process,
cooperative control of pretrial process, cooperative efforts, and alternative dispute res-
olution); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN; U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE
E. DIST. OF PA. (1991) (discussing systematic treatment for civil cases for case-specific
management, involvement ofjudicial officers in pretrial process, self-executing disclo-
sure, good faith, and representation by attorney with power to bind).
24 See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3152. "The expectation of the drafts-
men was that the power to make local rules would be used only on rare occasions
when the Civil Rules deliberately had left gaps to be filled in the light of recognized
local needs." Id.
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cretion afforded them by the rules, especially Rule 83, have cre-
ated their own "practices," increasing judicial management, some-
times to the point of inhibiting decisions on the merits.
III. THE 1985 AMENDMENT TO RULE 83 IN REGARD TO
INDIVIDUAL JUDGES' "PRACTICES"
Individual judges' practices present a threat to the goals of
the Federal Rules and to the constitutional rights of litigants.
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules permits the promulgation of local
rules to respond to conditions in individual district courts.
Charles Clark, the reporter for the original Federal Rules, ex-
plained Rule 83 as follows: "Some such provision affording flexi-
bility to the rules is necessary if they are to be adjusted easily and
without friction to the differing habits and customs of lawyers
throughout the country."2 5
Today, however, local district court rules and individual
judges' procedures govern far more than "differing habits and cus-
toms." 26 The drafters of the Federal Rules never intended that
judicially-created rules provided for by Rule 83 do more than regu-
late the "machinery of running" the court.27 The drafters never
anticipated the proliferation of individual judges' practices and
procedures. They assumed that in order to create a local district
court rule under Rule 83, a majority of judges of the district would
have to approve of such a measure. There was no discussion of
"individual judges' rules."
The advent of individual judges' rules can, however, be traced
to the 1985 amendment of Rule 83, which now states:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof
may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and
an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its
practice not inconsistent with these rules. A local rule so
adopted shall take effect upon the date specified by the district
court and shall remain in effect unless amended by the district
court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in which
the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made
by any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished
to the judicial council and the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts and be made available to the public. In all cases
25 6 "Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure"
1515 (Feb. 20-25, 1936).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules or those of the district in which they act.28
Under the amended rule, individual judges can promulgate their
own "practice," so long as it is not inconsistent with the Federal
Rules. Rule 83 also provides that all local rules must be subject to
public notice and comment prior to enactment. 29 Although the
Advisory Committee also noted in its comments to Rule 83 that it
"hoped" all district courts would create procedures to monitor indi-
vidual judges' practices and standing orders,30 the Rule does not
require public notice or an opportunity for comment on individual
judges' "practices. 31
The enactment of the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act of 1988 created a procedure to monitor district court
rules and individual judges' practices to ensure compliance with
the Federal Rules.32 The Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 33233 to permit
existing judicial councils to review district court rules and individ-
ual judges' "rules" for consistency with the Federal Rules.3 1 In ad-
dition, the Act gave judicial councils the power to modify or invali-
date nonconforming rules.3 5 The procedure was intended to be
28 FED R. Civ. P. 83.
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (advisory committee's notes). "The new language subjects
local rulemaking to scrutiny similar to that accompanying the Federal Rules, admin-
istrative rulemaking, and legislation. It attempts to assure that the expert advice of
practitioners and scholars is made available to the district court before local rules are
promulgated." Id.
30 Id.
The practice pursued by some judges of issuing standing orders has been
controversial, particularly among members of the practicing bar. The last
sentence in Rule 83 has been amended to make certain that standing orders
are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules or any local district court rules.
Beyond that, it is hoped that each district will adopt procedures, perhaps by
local rule, for promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders.
Id. (emphasis added).
31 Id. "The amended Rule does not detail the procedure for giving notice and an
opportunity to be heard since conditions vary from district to district. Thus, there is
no explicit requirement for a public hearing, although a district may consider that
procedure appropriate in all or some rulemaking situations." Id.
32 See Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988).
33 28 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. 1993).
34 Id. The rule provides in pertinent part: "Each judicial council shall periodically
review the rules which are prescribed under section 2071 of this title by district courts
within its circuit for consistency with rules prescribed under section 2072 of this title.
Each council may modify or abrogate any such rule found inconsistent . . ." Id.
§ 332(d)(4).
35 See id. § 332.
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ongoing; thus, a rule initially accepted by the judicial council could
later be rejected by the same council.36 As a result, rules that
could previously be overturned only by appellate action can now
be abrogated by the judicial council.
Unfortunately, however, judicial councils have not taken an
active role in reviewing the consistency of either local district
court rules or individual judges' standing orders and practices
with the Federal Rules. Therefore, despite the new procedure, lit-
igants must still rely upon appellate courts to review the validity
of individual judges' rules. The commentary to the 1988 revision
of section 332 states:
With a somewhat sturdier review procedure in place such as
§ 332 now enacts for all district court rule making, rules of the
kind that it took case law-and a long time-to strike down in
the past should find their way into the practice less frequently in
the future. And any that do will presumably last only until the
judicial council has had a chance to review it.37
The commentator, David D. Siegel, assumed that the same review
process applied to individual judges' rules. Indeed, the enactment
of this review structure was motivated in part by a desire to con-
trol the proliferation of individual judges' standing orders and
practices.38 Professor Siegel noted that before the 1988 revisions,
appellate review was "impossible sometimes, impractical most
times, and impolitic always."39 Although intended to reduce the
difficulty of striking down or limiting inconsistent individual
judges' rules, the revisions have done little to monitor or eliminate
the proliferation of these rules.
Although Rule 83 does not explicitly define "inconsistent,"40 it
is clear that an individual judge's rule need not directly contradict
the Federal Rules to be deemed "inconsistent." An individual
36 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 332 commentary (West 1993). David D. Siegel writes, "The
scrutiny is not to be limited, moreover, to the initial promulgations of rules. It is to be
on-going." Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 Id. (maintaining that there is "widespread discontent, communicated to Con-
gress, about a 'proliferation of local rules'"). This conclusion is consistent with the
extensive discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in Richardson Greenshields Se-
curities, Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1987), which involved Judge Shirley Wohl
Kram's requirement of a pre-motion conference before filing a motion. This situation
was cited as an example of what can be avoided if judicial council review is used
effectively.
39 Id.
40 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83.
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judge's rule is inconsistent with the Federal Rules if it conflicts
with the spirit of the Rules, needlessly repeats or restates a Fed-
eral Rule, is preempted by the Rules, or provides rigid procedural
guidelines in areas deliberately unregulated.4 1 Unfortunately,
district court judges have interpreted the term "inconsistent" nar-
rowly. As a result, individual judges have promulgated standing
orders or practices with apparent disregard for the letter or spirit
of the Federal Rules.42 The impetus for the proliferation of indi-
vidual judges' rules is the judicially-perceived need for increased
management of litigation.
IV. MOTION PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Individual judges' standing orders and practices have flour-
ished in the area of motion practice. Rules limiting a litigant's
right to file a motion demonstrate the problems caused by individ-
ual judges' practices.4 3 The Federal Rules governing motions in-
vite local innovation. Therefore, it is not surprising that this area
has been fertile ground for the proliferation of individual rulemak-
ing. Local innovation has reached the point where almost every
district and every judge has a different procedure regulating mo-
tion practice.
This sometimes bewildering variety in procedure is generally
a consequence of judicial attempts to improve efficiency. Unfortu-
nately, this often occurs at the expense of the original scheme of
the Rules. Federal Rules 7,44 12, 14,46 and 5647 entitle a litigant
41 REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON LOCAL DISTRICT COURT RULES III
(1940).
42 Weinstein, supra note 9, at 27-28. "[Olur faith in national uniformity has de-
clined. More local rules are being drafted by more courts to the point that procedure
... is significantly different [from court to court].... [Tihe pressures for local control
and initiative are great, and the costs ... high." Id.
43 See, e.g., Earle v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 554, 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (ruling
that reargument of motion was prohibited because litigant did not file application
within 14-day period prescribed by local rule), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958); Bagby
v. United States, 199 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1952) (deciding that failure to request
hearing on motion for summary judgment, as required by local rule, results in waiver
of argument and no denial of opportunity to be heard).
44 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). This Rule provides: "[A]n application to the court for an
order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made
in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the
relief or order sought." Id.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 12. This Rule provides for various motions, including a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, motion for a more definite statement, motion to strike
insufficient defenses, impertinent or scandalous matters, and the consolidation of de-
fenses in a motion. Id.
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to file various specific motions. Further, Rules 77 and 78 were en-
acted to facilitate the ability of any litigant to file a motion.48 Rule
77 provides that the district courts shall always be open so that,
inter alia, a litigant may file a motion.49 Likewise, Rule 78 states:
Unless local conditions make it impracticable, each district
court shall establish regular times and places, at intervals suffi-
ciently frequent for the prompt dispatch of business, at which
motions requiring notice and hearing may be heard and disposed
of; but the judge at any time or place and on such notice, if any,
as the judge considers reasonable may make orders for the ad-
vancement, conduct, and hearing of actions.
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by
rule or order for the submission and determination of motions
without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in
support and opposition. 50
Despite this mandate, individual judges have regulated motion
practice by requiring pre-motion conferences or pre-motion screen-
ing procedures prior to filing any motion.5 This practice is rela-
tively widespread and substantially differs among districts and
judges. Some courts consider any motion, regardless of its pur-
pose, to be an inefficient use of judicial time. Individual judges
have adopted rules that call for a pre-motion conference for all mo-
tions, while others require a conference only for discovery motions
or for dispositive motions. Although some judges require a confer-
ence between the parties before a motion is filed, others require a
conference with a judge before filing.
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 14. This Rule provides for a third party plaintiffs motion to join
a third party defendant in the action. Id.
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This Rule provides for a motion for summary judgment
stating that "at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of
the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, [a
claimant may] move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
the party's favor .....
48 See FED. R. Civ. P. 77(a) (providing in pertinent part that "district courts shall
be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading or other proper paper
... ."); FED. R. Civ. P. 78 (providing that "each district court shall establish regular
times and places, at intervals sufficiently frequent for the prompt dispatch of busi-
ness, at which motions requiring notice and hearing may be heard").
49 See FED. R. Civ. P. 77.
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 78.
51 See Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 649 (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting that judge required conference with litigants prior to filing of motions); see
also 12 WIGTrr & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3154 (asserting that it is extremely com-
mon for judges to promulgate rules governing motion practice).
1994]
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The effect of these practices is that judges have fewer motions
to decide and fewer orders subject to appellate review. 52 From the
judges' perspective, they have accomplished their stated objective
of discouraging litigants from filing unnecessary motions. Judges
contend that these pre-motion practices encourage settlements
and create efficiency, and point to a decrease in the number of mo-
tions filed before their courts as an indication of increased effi-
ciency and satisfaction among the parties.
Hearing fewer motions does not, however, demonstrate effi-
ciency. Instead of arguing motions, litigants waste time schedul-
ing and attending pre-motion conferences. Further, it seems the
judiciary sometimes sacrifices justice for the sake of speed or sim-
plicity, thus conflicting with the mandate that the Federal Rules
"be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action."53 Requiring pre-motion conferences inter-
feres with the goals of the original drafters of the Federal Rules,54
creates a real risk of judicial coercion, raises serious due process
concerns, invades an area pre-empted by the Federal Rules, and
obstructs litigants from filing motions in the manner provided in
the Rules themselves.
V. THE RESPONSE OF THE APPELLATE COURTS TO INDIVIDUAL
JUDGES' RULES
Although there are a number of cases that question the valid-
ity of local district court rules, cases that consider the validity of
individual judges' rules are scarce. Consequently, the appellate
courts have had little opportunity to rule on the issue.5 5 Litigants
and attorneys are often reluctant to question the practices of a
district court judge because they must deal with that judge in cur-
rent or future litigation. In addition, appellate judges are seem-
52 See Richardson, 825 F.2d at 652. "This ... may serve the useful purpose of
narrowing and resolving conflicts between the parties and preventing the filing of
unnecessary papers." Id.
53 FED. R. Cry. P. 1; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing policy of
simplifying procedure).
54 See Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1906-07. Weinstein recognizes that the draft-
ers of the Federal Rules intended to facilitate the hearing of cases on the merits with-
out the hinderance of undue procedural technicalities. Id. "The drafters' commitment
was to a civil practice in which all parties would have ready access to the courts and to
relevant information, a practice in which the merits would be reached promptly and
decided fairly." Id. at 1906.
55 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 332 (West 1993) (maintaining that appellate level serves as
'massive ... barrier" to review).
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ingly hesitant to undermine the procedures of their colleagues in
the trial courts. Therefore, the issue of the validity of individual
judges' rules rarely reaches the appellate level, and when it does,
appellate courts are disinclined to criticize these procedures.
Aside from political considerations, the litigants' inability to
pursue an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292
imposes a further barrier to appellate review of individual judges'
rules.56 If the district judge refuses to certify the issue, the party's
sole remedy is to seek an extraordinary writ from the circuit court
of appeals.
Recently, in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc.,57 the
Second Circuit ruled on the validity of individual judges' standing
orders. In Schoenberg, an author, alleging that defendants pub-
lished his manuscript without proper authorization, brought suit
for copyright infringement, breach of contract, and inducing
breach of contract.5 In their amended answer, the defendants as-
serted a defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 One day
after the answer was served pursuant to the district court judge's
rule,60 the defendants requested a pre-motion conference to pres-
ent a motion to dismiss the complaint.61 At the subsequent pre-
trial conference, the judge refused to permit the submission of the
motion to dismiss until defendants had complied with the plain-
tiffs document request.62 The court, however, allowed the plain-
tiff to file a motion to compel discovery, which the court granted.63
When defendants did not fully comply with this order, the court
imposed sanctions and held defendants' attorney in contempt.
64
56 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949) (assert-
ing that purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides for appeals only from final deci-
sions, is to combine all stages of proceedings in one review); see also Gardner v. West-
inghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1977) (ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 1292
mandates that interlocutory appeals will be granted only on very narrow grounds),
affd, 437 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1978).
57 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
58 Id. at 928.
59 Id.
60 Id. Judge Edelstein's rule required a pre-motion conference. Id.
61 Id. The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was filed pur-
suant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules. Id. at 926.
62 Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 929.
63 Id. The motion to compel discovery was filed pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 927.
64 Id. After a number of requests to the court to reconsider its decision to prohibit
defendants from filing a motion to dismiss, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Second Circuit. Id. The petition to vacate the order compelling dis-
covery and to permit defendants to file their motion was denied. Id. Despite this de-
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In disposing of the defendants' attorney's appeal from the con-
tempt order, the Second Circuit only briefly addressed the propri-
ety of the district court judge's pre-motion requirement. In disap-
proving of the district court's practice of requiring compliance
with plaintiffs discovery request prior to filing a substantive mo-
tion,65 the circuit court explained: "Whenever a court directs a
lawyer that he or she may not make a motion, it is in effect cutting
the lines of communication between the court and the litigants."66
The Second Circuit held that only in "extraordinary" situations
should litigants be prohibited from filing motions. 67 By not per-
mitting defendants to file their motion, the district court, in effect,
multiplied the number of necessary proceedings, 68  and dramati-
cally increased the amount of time and money the parties
expended.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Brown v. Crawford County,69 thor-
oughly addressed the validity of individual judges' standing orders
and practices. In Brown, a real estate developer brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against county officials, alleg-
ing that they had conspired to prevent him from developing a mo-
bile home subdivision.70 The developer further alleged that city
officials had imposed a moratorium on development, thereby vio-
lating his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights on theories of
uncompensated taking, and denials of equal protection and sub-
nial, defendants continued to ignore the order. Id. Plaintiff moved for contempt, which
first required scheduling the necessary pre-motion conference. Id. Prior to the confer-
ence, the defendants, intending to comply with the order, provided plaintiff with the
requested documents. Id. Believing that they had complied with the order, defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court refused to consider. Id. The pre-
motion conference was held, and the court permitted plaintiff to file a motion for con-
tempt, which was granted. Id.
65 Id. at 935. "Furthermore, we are deeply troubled by the district court's require-
ment that defendants comply with plaintiffs discovery request before being permitted
to submit their motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 935-36 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 936.
67 Id. (quoting Richardson, 825 F.2d at 652). "Absent extraordinary circum-
stances,.., a court has no power to prevent a party from filing pleadings, motions, or
appeals authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Richardson, 825 F.2d at
652.
68 See Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 936. "This elimination of dialogue can result, as is
the case here, in the multiplication of proceedings, especially when a party is seeking
to raise a threshold issue." Id.
69 960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992).
70 Id. at 1005.
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stantive and procedural due process. 7 1 The defendants wanted to
file a summary judgment motion, but an individual judge's rule
adopted by certain judges within the Middle District of Georgia
required pre-motion, judicial approval.72 In particular, the rule
governing motions for summary judgment outlined the following
procedure:
[T]he filing of motions for summary judgment is frequently a
waste of your time, opposing counsel's time, our clerk's time, and
the court's time-not to mention the expense of each party and
the taxpayers. To assist you in avoiding the filing of summary
judgment motions that have no possible merit, the court requests
that before filing such a motion you advise the court and oppos-
ing counsel in person (call the judge for an appointment) or by
letter if you desire to file such motion and your factual and legal
reasons, succinctly stated, for believing you will prevail on the
motion. Opposing counsel can then respond in person or by let-
ter and the court can suggest whether or not the case seems to be
appropriate for summary judgment. This is not intended to pro-
hibit your filing such motions; it is only intended to facilitate
your doing so.
In considering the filing of a summary judgment motion, pre-
pare to include proposed findings of undisputed material facts
(with reference to source of facts) and conclusions of law in your
motion. This will be required. 3
The defendants complied with the judge's rule, but the judge de-
nied approval for filing the motion, stating that: "I do not believe
this is a case that should be decided on motion for summary judg-
ment."74 The defendants, frustrated by an individual judge's rule
that did not facilitate, but rather prohibited, the filing of a motion,
filed a motion to dismiss. 7 5
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, inquiring into defendant's
reasons for not filing a motion to dismiss instead of a motion for
summary judgment, focused its attention on the rule's validity.
Troubled by the absence from the record of the correspondence be-
tween the trial court and the litigants leading to the judge's deci-
sion, the court stated:
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1007.
73 Id. (stating district court judge's procedures and policies).
74 Id. at 1008 (quoting letter from district court judge to counsel for defendants).
75 Brown, 960 F.2d at 1008.
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We emphasize to the district court that it is essential that com-
munications between the trial court and the parties to an action
as well as all rulings affecting the procedural rights of parties be
shown on the docket and contained in the record to afford com-
plete review by this court. Parties' procedural rights cannot be
sacrificed in the interest of moving busy dockets. 7 6
Turning to the relationship of individual judges' rules to the Fed-
eral Rules, Senior Circuit Judge Morgan noted that Rule 83 pro-
vided for local district court rules so long as they are not inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules.77 Although the court acknowledged
that the individual judge's rule at issue was not a local rule, the
court held that these "local procedures" should be reviewed by the
same procedure as local rules. Noting that Federal Rule 56 gov-
erning motions for summary judgment does not require prelimi-
nary procedures prior to the filing of a motion, the court held that
the trial court's pre-screening of the summary judgment motion
violated the litigant's procedural and substantive rights under
Rule 56 and was therefore invalid.78
To date, the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Brown is the most
noteworthy disapproval of individual judges' rules. Many courts,
however, have not been as critical of such practices, and have even
condoned pre-motion screening procedures. For example, in Rich-
ardson Greenshields Securities, Inc. v. Lau,79 District Court Judge
Kram of the Southern District of New York required a pre-motion
conference to consider the defendant's request to file a motion for
leave to file an amended answer, in accordance with her rule of
practice regarding all motions.8 0 However, Judge Kram's cham-
bers refused to schedule the conference before the statute of limi-
tations had run on the counterclaims the defendants wished to as-
sert in their amended answer. The defendants were finally able to
file their motion after the conference was held, some four months
after the statute expired.' Judge Kram denied the motion on the
ground that the defendants "offered no justifiable excuse for [the]
76 Id. at 1008 n.7.
77 Id. at 1008 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 83); see 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988) ("Such
rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed under section 2072 of this title.").
78 Id. at 1009.
79 825 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1987).
80 Id. at 652.
81 Id.
The refusal to permit a motion to be filed without a prior conference, fol-
lowed by a failure to hold such a conference until nearly five months after
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delay." 2 In this instance, Judge Kram's standing order went be-
yond administrative regulation. It directly interfered with the
party's right to file a motion provided by the Federal Rules, in par-
ticular Rules 77 and 78,83 and possibly prejudiced a viable claim.
On appeal, the Second Circuit did not condemn the individual
judge's rule, stating that "[wie do not suggest that district judges
cannot require a conference prior to the filing of motions as a
means of managing litigation .... ,84 At the same time, however,
the court noted that individual judges' rules must not be inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules, and stated that "[a]bsent extraordi-
nary circumstances ... a court has no power to prevent a party
from filing pleadings, motions or appeals authorized by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure."8 5
VI. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM REQUIRING PRE-MOTION
PROCEDURES
A. Inconsistency with the Federal Rules
The Federal Rules were adopted to eliminate procedural
traps, ensure decisions upon the merits, and improve the speed
and efficiency of litigation. Local rules requiring pre-motion pro-
cedures hinder these goals in two ways. First, failure to follow
local rules governing such pre-motion procedures has resulted in
the dismissal of parties' claims, rather than decisions on the mer-
its.8 6 Judicial discretion afforded by the Federal Rules was meant
to allow judges to rule upon the merits, while providing needed
flexibility to control the procedure of the court. The Federal Rules
one was first requested, and then by a denial of the motion ... , are actions
so 'at odds with the purpose and intent of [the Federal Rules] ...."
Id. (quoting Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1961)).
82 Id. at 650 (quoting district court order denying defendant's motion to amend).
83 See supra text accompanying notes 48-49 (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 78 and
79).
84 Richardson, 825 F.2d at 652.
85 Id. Local rules, likewise, cannot supplant the Federal Rules. See Wilson v. City
of Zanesville, 954 F.2d 349, 352 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451,
453 (6th Cir. 1991)). In Wilson, the circuit court stated that Federal Rules 26(b)(1)
and 34(a)(1) superseded the local rules. Id. Judge Martin held that the district court
"erred in denying Wilson's motion to compel discovery based on his failure to adhere
to local court rules in a situation clearly governed by the Federal Rules." Id. at 353.
86 See, e.g., Wilson, 954 F.2d at 349. In Wilson, the plaintiffs failure to attach an
affidavit to his motion resulted in the denial of his motion to compel production of a
tape. Id. As a result, the plaintiff was unable to meet his burden of proof and the
district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 350.
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were not intended to permit judges to create their own pre-motion
procedures which prevent decisions upon the merits.
Second, pre-motion procedures often delay the litigation pro-
cess. In many cases, a judge can dispose of a motion in less time
than it takes to schedule and attend a pre-motion conference or
similar procedure. Thus, in implementing their pre-motion proce-
dures, some judges have failed to recognize that the goals of the
Federal Rules and of our judicial process can be compromised
through overzealous judicial management.8 7
B. Additional Risks of Pre-Motion Procedures
Aside from interfering with the goals of the Federal Rules,
pre-motion procedures create certain practical problems.88 In a
conference, the judge sometimes takes an active, or even coercive,
role, arguably altering the dynamics of the litigation to the com-
bined detriment of the parties. In this posture, the judge exercises
an inappropriate amount of influence upon the course of the litiga-
tion.8 9 This influence is amplified since all conversations at these
conferences are not on the record, so that much of the judge's con-
duct will be difficult, if not impossible, to review.9" The increased
managerial role of judges was meant to facilitate the parties' abil-
ity to bring a case to trial,9 ' not to permit judges to take a coercive
role in the litigation.
87 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376, 431 (1982) (out-
lining increased role of judges as managers and warning that this brings inherent
risk). "Although the sword remains in place, the blindfold and scales have all but
disappeared." Id.
88 See generally id. at 424-31 (setting forth proposed aims of increased judicial
oversight).
89 See id. at 425-26. "Transforming the judge from adjudicator to manager sub-
stantially expands the opportunities for judges to use-or abuse-their power ....
[Diecisions [are] made privately, informally, off the record, and beyond the reach of
appellate review." Id.
90 Id. "The extensive information that judges receive during pretrial conferences
has not been filtered by the rules of evidence. Some of this information is received ex
parte, a process that deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to contest the
validity of information received." Id. at 427. Judges may also develop personal
prejudices against an attorney as there is much interaction during the "management"
phase. Id.
91 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2). The purpose of the pretrial conference is to estab-
lish "early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of
lack of management... ." Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 21-22 (discuss-
ing increased judicial management).
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This coercive judicial influence threatens a party's due pro-
cess rights.2 The Federal Rules provide for litigants to file mo-
tions freely.93 However, litigants are often unable to even reach
the merits of a motion because of the coercive and overriding influ-
ence of the judge.9 4 Also, the delay inherent in trying to schedule
(and often to reschedule) such a conference may inhibit litigants
from making just and proper motions. When litigants are not af-
forded the opportunity to file a motion because of a judge's coer-
cive influence, express prohibition, or unnecessary delay, the liti-
gant's due process rights are violated.95 As Judge Robert E.
Keeton stated: "Trial and preparation for trial should not become
a game of moves in which the judge, as umpire, calls players out
for not touching bases, and in the right sequence."96 Furthermore,
by promulgating rules that require extensive pre-motion proce-
dures, judges dilute the adversarial nature of litigation and deny
the parties the opportunity to aggressively promote their inter-
ests.9 7 This is in apparent conflict with the "bedrock premise of
the federal rules... that cases filed in a federal district court are
92 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in per-
tinent part, that no "state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." Id. It has been held that a cause of action is a species of
property protected by the Due Process Clause. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
93 See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (providing generally for filing of motions). It is un-
derstood that few restrictions should be placed on movants. See Richardson, 825 F.2d
647, 653 n.6 ("A motion to amend should be denied only for such reasons as 'undue
delay, bad faith, futility of the amendment, and.., the resulting prejudice to the
opposing party.'"(citation omitted)). Nonetheless, a motion must be grounded in fact
and warranted by existing law or good faith argument. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 63-74 (discussing Brown where district
judge summarily and arbitrarily concluded that case was not amenable to summary
judgement); see also Beary v. City of Rye, 601 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing trial
court decision for placing administrative interests over principles of fairness).
95 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (finding lack of
due process when claimant's wrongful discharge claim was dismissed due to state
agency's failure to convene hearing within 120 days as mandated by statute); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) ("'Due process requires that [defendants be pro-
vided] an opportunity to present every available defense'" (quoting American Surety
Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932))); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965) (procedural due process requires that party have opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.").
96 Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniform-
ity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853, 853 (1989).
97 See Resnik, supra note 87, at 429 n.209 and accompanying text. Professor Res-
nik posits that the "norms that operate in most negotiations are absent when judges
sit at the bargaining table." Id.
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to be resolved through adversarial litigation before the court
"98
A judge's ability to limit the filing of motions is also con-
stricted by pre-emption through the Federal Rules. Section
2072(a) of title 28 of the United States Code authorizes the
Supreme Court to "prescribe general rules of practice and proce-
dure . . . for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals."99
Section 2072(b) then states that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect."100 Arguably, some individual judges' rules are
therefore pre-empted by the Federal Rules. 101
CONCLUSION
The role of judge as manager and the goal of promulgating
individual judges' rules that are consistent with the Federal Rules
can coexist within the federal court system. The Federal Rules
encourage judicial discretion in order to achieve decisions upon
the merits. Unfortunately, some judges have abused this discre-
tion by raising procedural hurdles, forcing cases off their dockets,
and discouraging decisions upon the merits. Judge Jack Wein-
stein observed that a more appropriate response to the "litigation
explosion" was to increase the number of judges and the capacity
of the system to handle the cases.102 This has not been the courts'
reaction. Instead, courts have discouraged parties from litigating
by promulgating rules that distort the adversary system. The
elimination of individual judges' rules that are inconsistent with
the Federal Rules would be an important step towards restoring
the Federal Rules and the system they govern to that which was
envisioned by the original drafters.
98 David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal
Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
537, 545 (1985).
99 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a) (West 1993).
100 Id. § 2072(b).
101 See Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1991) (ruling that district
court improperly expanded its authority when its interpretation of local rule super-
seded domain of Federal Rule 41(b)).
102 Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1909-10.
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